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Does the messenger matter? 
A comparison of the effects of Euroskeptic messages communicated by 
mainstream and radical right-wing parties on citizens’ EU attitudes  
ABSTRACT  
 
The fact that the European elections in 2014 resulted in an unprecedented success for 
Euroskeptic parties raises questions concerning the influence of political elites on 
citizens’ Euroskepticism. This paper examines whether Euroskeptic messages have a 
different impact when communicated by mainstream right-wing parties versus their 
more radical counterparts. We do so using data from a survey experiment conducted in 
Germany in 2013. Our results show that Euroskeptic messages from mainstream parties 
significantly increase Eurosketicism among voters but that those effects are confined 
largely to ‘in’-partisans. Furthermore, when a message is effective among ‘out’-
partisans, it is due to a combined effect of source and message credibility. This holds 
true for both mainstream and radical right parties suggesting that contrary to 
expectations, the former do not enjoy any advantage over the latter in terms of 
perceived credibility. 
Keywords: Campaign Advertisements, Euroskepticism, Survey Experiment, Party 
Identification, Source Credibility, Message Credibility 
 
 
 
2 
Introduction 
In the light of citizens’ decreasing support of the European Union and evidence from 
current research showing that political elites do shape citizens’ EU-attitudes, this paper 
aims at answering the question whether Euroskeptic party advertisements have a 
different impact when communicated by mainstream parties compared to parties with 
radical ideologies. For a long time, EU integration has been regarded as an elite project 
resting on citizens’ “permissive consensus” (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). However, 
public support for EU integration has been waning (e.g., De Vries and Edwards 2009), 
especially in times of financial and economic crisis (e.g., Armingeon and Ceka 2014; 
also see Eurobaromenter 2014), and has recently even resulted in the majority of British 
people voting to leave the Union. We know that economic factors, identity-related 
considerations, and evaluations of the own national state, which are also attributed to 
the EU, shape citizens’ EU attitudes (Armingeon and Ceka 2014; Hobolt and Wratil 
2015; Hooghe and Marks 2005). However, these forces do not develop in a vacuum. 
Instead, research has shown that it is elites, i.e. parties and mass media, with their cues 
and arguments that shape citizens’ attitudes (Zaller 1992). As most people only learn 
about matters of EU integration from public discourse, it is this publicly visible 
information provided by the elites, which has shown to be important for EU attitude 
formation (Maier and Rittberger 2008, 2012; De Vries and Edwards 2009; Ray 2003; 
Steenbergen et al. 2007).  
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Against the backdrop of citizens’ declining EU support and elites’ influence on citizens’ 
EU attitudes, we ask which political elites are potentially able to have a significant 
negative impact on EU support. We thereby differentiate between the effectiveness of 
different messengers in communicating identical EU-skeptical messages, i.e. 
mainstream right-wing parties as compared to parties with radical ideologies. To answer 
our research question, we draw on and develop the literature on party affiliation as a 
heuristic or cue for voters. We develop this research in three main ways. First, we 
extend the focus beyond mainstream parties to include smaller, more radical parties. In 
this regard, we are able to connect to newer research that seeks to understand how cue-
effectiveness varies among parties (Brader et al. 2012; Coan et al. 2008; Merolla et al. 
2008). Second, we extend the focus geographically beyond the U.S. which has been a 
focal point for much of the research to date (Bullock, 2011; Sniderman, 2000). Finally, 
we examine the causal mechanism behind the effects of party messages by 
differentiating between effects that are based on partisanship and source credibility and 
those based on message credibility, i.e. independent of source. The findings are 
important in that they allow us to better identify those sections of the electorate that are 
most likely to be affected by Euroskeptic messages if that message is communicated by 
a mainstream or a radical party. 
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We have chosen Germany as the subject for empirical analysis because it has a 
comparatively EU-friendly climate, which allows us to observe the emergence of 
Euroskeptic attitudes. Among many other European countries this process is already in 
full flow (see Eurobarometer 2013), and we would expect it to be more difficult to 
observe effects from just one experimental treatment in such environments. Germany is 
one of the few European countries with no major anti EU-party − at least until 2013 
when the fieldwork for this analysis was completed − and with citizens supporting EU 
integration to a greater extent than the average European (according to Eurobarometer, 
in 2013 68% of Germans agreed that EU-membership was a good thing compared to an 
EU-average of 50%). In this EU-friendly setting, we conducted an online survey 
experiment on the effect of a strongly Euroskeptic message – in one case communicated 
by a challenger party with a radical ideology (Die Republikaner) and in the other case 
communicated by a mainstream party (CSU, the Bavarian sister party of the ruling CDU 
in Germany, which belongs to the strongly pro-European group of Christian Democrats 
in the European Union; see Crum 2007).  
 
To answer our research question regarding messenger effects, we proceed in four steps. 
First, on the basis of literature on parties as cue-givers, we derive hypotheses about the 
effectiveness of Euroskeptic messages communicated by different messengers. Second, 
we describe our experimental design, fieldwork, and the operationalization of the 
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dependent and independent variables. We then turn to the empirical findings which are 
discussed in the results section. Finally, we summarize the study and discuss the 
potential areas for future research as well as possible study limitations. 
 
Effectiveness of parties’ cues on in-partisans and out-partisans 
Party cues and in-partisans – the role of party identification 
In their classical account of the American Voter, Campbell et al. (1960) already pointed 
out the relevance of parties as messengers or as sources of information. As a 
consequence of citizens’ identification with a specific party, this party serves as “a 
supplier of cues by which the individual may evaluate the elements of politics” 
(Campbell et al. 1960, 128). If a new political issue arises, they use the party cues as 
shortcuts in order to choose a political position and cast their vote, although they often 
do not understand the underlying complex policy issues. These assumptions regarding 
the functions of party cues for party identifiers, later on called “in-partisans” (see also 
Zaller 1992), rest on a core finding of social psychology, namely that in-groups define 
the very meaning of objects (e.g., Cohen 2003; Tajfel et al. 1971): One follows those 
individuals whose values and identities one shares.  
 
A long tradition of empirical research has accumulated evidence for the relevance of 
partisan cues for party identifiers. They have been shown to influence attitudes towards 
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policy issues (e.g., Cohen 2003; Kam 2005) and to shape perceptions of candidates and 
their respective issue positions (e.g., Mondak 1993; Rahn 1993). Their effect on voting 
decisions has also been demonstrated (e.g., Lau and Redlawsk 2001). It has been shown 
that partisan cues have the capacity to overcome framing effects (Druckman 2001) and 
even to be effective in situations in which the content of a persuasive message is not in 
line with the preferred party’s position. Cohen (2003, 819), for example, concludes 
from a series of experimental studies: “If information about the position of their party 
was available…, participants assumed that position as their own regardless of the 
content of the policy.”  
 
Although the general relevance of party cues has been proven, the gradual effectiveness 
of cues varies. This conditional nature of partisan cueing is on the top of today’s 
research agenda. There are three, often overlapping, strands of research that seek to 
understand the conditions under which cueing is most effective. First, research focuses 
on the variation among issues and thereby often analyses the relative importance of 
partisan cues in comparison to the policy / issue information (for a summary, Bullock 
2011). Some studies have demonstrated that cues seem to be more important for 
(complex) issues regarding on which people do not have fixed opinions (e.g., 
Arceneaux 2008; Coan 2008; Cohen 2003; Rahn 1993). Moreover, the amount of policy 
information also seems important: The more information is available, the stronger 
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people tend to rely on that information, thus lessening the relevance of cues (Bullock 
2011).  
 
Second, research also seeks to disentangle individual differences in cue effectiveness 
among partisans. Some authors claim that only less informed and low motivated 
persons follow cues; others find evidence that cues might not only be relevant for those 
unmotivated and less informed, but also for those who are motivated and highly 
politically aware (for a summary, see Bullock 2011). In this context, Arceneaux (2008) 
again emphasizes the role of cues in cases in which the information contradicts the 
partisan line. He finds that only highly aware partisans are likely to punish candidates 
who depart from their party’s line when the issue is highly salient. In situations with 
low salience, even highly involved partisans follow cues that contradict their partisan 
line. Furthermore, it has been shown that highly aware citizens rely more heavily on 
party cues in ambivalent and unfamiliar situations (e.g., Chaiken and Maheswaran 
1994; Zaller 1992) and that they are the most misinformed in situations where heuristics 
are inaccurate (Dancey and Sheagley 2013).  
 
Third, research has highlighted differences among parties in setting cues effectively. 
The U.S. Democrats and Republicans have been in the focus of this research, and even 
in this two-party system with only mainstream parties being analysed, there is some 
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evidence that their cues differ in effectiveness (Bullock 2011): Republican voters were 
shown to be more strongly influenced by cues than Democrats. This influence was even 
higher on Republicans with higher levels of need for cognition, whereas it was weaker 
among Democrats with the same attributes. Empirical studies on parties other than U.S. 
mainstream parties are rare. One exception is the research by Merolla et al. (2008) who 
showed in Canada that only the party with the most distinct ideological program was 
effective in cue-setting across various issues. This finding is supported by research 
showing that opposition parties with a clear ideology are more effective in cue-setting 
compared to governing parties or parties with a less clear-cut ideology (Brader et al. 
2012). Differences among parties are also emphasized by Coan et al. (2008), who 
showed that minor parties have more difficulty in effectively setting their cues. Finally, 
in his analysis of the conditional nature of partisan cues on EU attitudes, Ray (2003) 
also points to the relevance of a party-level factor: Parties that are united on the issue − 
in this case: EU integration − are more successful in effective cue-setting than parties 
that face inner-party struggles.  
 
Party cues and out-partisans – comparing effects of source and message credibility  
Although research mostly focuses on the effect of party cueing on the own partisan base 
(in-partisans), we know that party messages have the capacity to reach even further, 
influencing the attitudes of non-partisans (i.e. independents) as well as partisans from 
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other parties (for empirical evidence see, e.g., Maier et al. 2012, Slothuus and de Vreese 
2010). In accordance with Zaller (1992, p. 250), we refer to both groups as “out-
partisans” in this paper.  
 
Following the most prominent cognitive models of persuasion (Petty & Cacioppo 1981; 
Chaiken 1980), we can distinguish two message-related drivers of attitude change: the 
argument itself and source cues, the most important being the sender of a message. The 
persuasive capacity of both aspects is influenced by credibility judgements. We 
therefore can distinguish message credibility and source credibility (Appelman and 
Sundar 2015; Metzger et al. 2003). Research on message credibility, defined as “the 
individual’s judgement of the veracity of the content of communication” (Appelman 
and Sundar 2015, 5), shows how the message structure, content, delivery, and style 
influence credibility judgements (for a summary, Metzger et al. 2003).  
 
The more prominent strand of research, however, concerns source credibility. This 
research dates back to Hovland’s work (1954, 1071) which shows that “who says 
something is usually as important as what is said in the determination of the impact of a 
communication.” In the last decades, researchers have worked on understanding what 
source credibility is and how it impacts persuasion processes. Following Perloff (2003) 
and Jacob (2008) most researchers agree that (1) source credibility is not an attribute of 
 
 
10 
the source as such but results from the perceptions of the audience and that (2) it 
contains several dimensions. Therefore, source credibility encompasses at least two 
aspects: the perceived expertise (i.e. the knowledge, accuracy, and precision) and 
trustworthiness of the sender (i.e. the belief that the sender will act in the interest of the 
receiver; e.g., Kelman & Hovland 1953, for a summary, Rouner 2008).  
 
Turning to the effects of source credibility, research has accumulated strong evidence 
for its impact on the persuasive capacity of a message, such as effects on attitudes and 
behavioural intentions (e.g., Hovland and Weiss 1951; Miller and Krosnick 2000; 
Druckman 2001; Kareklas et al. 2015; for a summary, Pornpitakpan 2004). It has been 
proven that people may reject messages from sources they regard as not credible (Lupia 
and McCubbins 1998). Yet, researchers have been working on disentangling the 
conditional nature of such effects. First, there are individual-level variables that 
influence the magnitude of source credibility effects. Those willing and able to process 
information with high involvement rely less on source cues than those with low 
involvement (Petty and Cacioppo 1981; Chaiken 1980). However, Kumkale et al. 
(2010) claim that this effect can only be observed in situations in which people have not 
yet formed attitudes. In addition, Chaiken and Maheswaran (1994) qualify the original 
finding by showing that source credibility is not only important for those with low 
involvement, but also for those highly involved if they are exposed to ambiguous 
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messages. Second, it is the availability of information about the source that influences 
effects of source credibility. If information about sources is revealed too late, source 
credibility is of less importance (O’Keefe 2002). Finally, the stronger effects of highly 
credible sources seem to get weaker over the course of time as sources are forgotten or 
dissociated (for a summary of the sleeper effect, Schenk 2008).  
 
To sum up, therefore, party messages are understood to work in a twofold manner: First, 
they will have the strongest influence on their own partisans (in-partisans). Here, party 
identification and attachment serve as information shortcuts. Second, party messages 
may also persuade out-partisans (i.e. non-partisans as well as partisans from other 
parties, see above) if they are judged credible. Credibility here can refer either to the 
sender (source credibility)1 or to the argument (message credibility) presented. In order 
to fully understand the causal mechanism behind the impact of party messages and their 
wider implications for the electorate as a whole, it is thus important to distinguish 
between the effects of source and message credibility. Based on this reasoning, we now 
derive our hypotheses on the persuasive potential of mainstream and radical parties’ 
messages on in- and out-partisans.    
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Development of hypotheses  
In our paper, we seek to look at the conditional nature of party cueing. Our main focus 
lies on the different capacities of mainstream and radical parties for cue-giving in multi-
party systems. In such systems, we find not only a greater number, but often also 
ideologically more diverse parties. As a consequence, mainstream parties are often 
confronted with ideologically radical parties (Hobolt and De Vries 2011). Research so 
far (see above) shows that parties with distinct ideologies are better able to successfully 
provide cues to their partisans. However, we do not know whether this applies to radical 
parties. Moreover, we lack information on how out-partisans may perceive the 
credibility of such radical parties’ messages.  
  
In general, we expect that (right-wing) mainstream parties will have a greater impact on 
citizens’ EU attitudes when sending an identical Euroskeptic message compared to 
parties with a radical (right-wing) ideology. We base our expectation on the 
assumptions that mainstream parties not only have a broader partisan base which will 
support the partisan message, but that they will also be judged as more credible by out-
partisans. This leads us to our first hypothesis: 
(H1) A Euroskeptic message from a mainstream party will have a greater 
impact in general than the same message communicated by radical challenger parties 
(mainstream effect-hypothesis).  
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Note, however, that in this hypothesis the two mechanisms of partisanship and source 
credibility are conflated. We will disentangle these in the following hypotheses and 
steps of analysis. Turning to the effects on in-partisans first, we expect classic cueing 
effects for partisans of mainstream as well as for partisans of radical parties. However, 
we assume these effects to vary in detail. For mainstream parties, we expect a 
Euroskeptic campaign message to have a negative effect on in-partisans’ EU attitudes – 
even though such a message would contradict the classical pro-European party line.  
However, for partisans of radical parties with an extreme ideology, we expect a ceiling 
effect of partisan messages. Hence it is unlikely that such partisans turn even more 
negative towards Europe after the reception of just one campaign video. Unfortunately, 
we need to focus on mainstream partisans in our empirical analysis due to low case 
numbers of subjects affiliated with the radical party. Moreover, while we expect 
mainstream partisans to follow their own party, we also presume that they will not be 
affected by the same message when communicated by a radical party. This leads us to 
our second hypothesis: 
(H2) Euroskeptic cues of mainstream parties will affect their own partisans, 
whereas the same message communicated by a radical party has no effect on 
mainstream partisans (partisan-hypothesis).  
If this holds, then we expect that mainstream parties play the decisive role regarding the 
question of whether Euroskepticism generally increases in society.  
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Turning to the effects on out-partisans, we expect variation in propagating 
Euroskepticism between mainstream and radical parties due to differences in perceived 
source credibility. It is likely that messages sent by mainstream parties will be regarded 
as credible, whereas the same information transmitted by radical parties will lack 
credibility due to the status of the messenger itself. Consequently, we claim: 
(H3a) Among out-partisans, mainstream parties’ enjoy higher source credibility 
compared to radical parties (party credibility-hypothesis).  
We expect this credibility bonus of the mainstream party’s message to persist even if it 
is not in line with its traditional policy position. Furthermore, we expect that source 
credibility is crucial in persuading out-partisans. We therefore claim:  
(H3b) The effectiveness of a televised advertisement on out-partisans will 
depend on the source of the message, independently from its credibility (source cue-
hypothesis).  
Alternatively, the effectiveness of the party message could also be mediated by the 
perceived credibility of the message itself (see Figure 1). Our final hypothesis therefore 
states:  
(H3c) The party effect on EU attitudes will be mediated by message credibility 
(source & message credibility-hypothesis).  
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Figure 1 
 
Before we turn to the results of our study, we will briefly describe our experimental 
design, the fieldwork, and the operationalization of our dependent and independent 
variables.  
 
Methods 
Fieldwork and Experimental Design 
To test the effects of Eurosceptic messages of mainstream and radical challenger parties 
on citizens’ EU attitudes, we conducted a survey experiment with two experimental 
groups using a German online access panel provided by the market research institute 
gfk, Nuremberg in May and June 2013. A quota sample was drawn taking into account 
the variables age, education, gender, and geographic region.2 After a quality check, 679 
interviews were rated as having good quality and were used for the analysis.3 Within the 
sample, 47% of the participants were female, and their average age was 44.9 years 
(SD=14.0); 25.8% had not graduated from secondary school, 36.5% had graduated from 
secondary school, 17.7% had qualified for university, and 20.0% had obtained a 
university degree. 
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As we are interested in understanding the role of different messengers communicating 
identical messages, we only manipulated the name of the party voicing the message in 
our treatment material. The challenge was to make it plausible that each of the cue-
sending parties could propose such a Euroskeptic policy position (for a similar attempt, 
see Brader & Tucker 2012). We therefore first picked an ideologically right-wing 
challenger party (Die Republikaner) which has never been part of the German national 
parliament and which holds a strong Euroskeptic position (CHES-rating 1999: 1.75; see 
Bakker et al. 2015). As the second party, we chose the mainstream Christian Social 
Union (CSU), the Bavarian sister party of the large ruling conservative Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU) in Germany, which belongs to the strongly pro-European 
group of Christian Democrats in the European Union. However, among German 
mainstream parties, the Bavarian CSU is the most Euroskeptical party (average CHES-
rating 2010 and 2014: 4.90). It even broadcasted a rather Euroskeptical campaign ad at 
the beginning of the 2014 European election campaign. Still, the strong anti-EU 
message we used as stimulus material was on all accounts to be regarded as counter to 
the partisan line of the CSU – at least at the time of data collection in 2013. An 
alternative option which would have allowed an even more rigid test of the hypotheses 
would have been to choose the very pro-European governing CDU as comparator to the 
Republikaner. However, as the CDU holds very pro-European positions (average 
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CHES-rating 2010 and 2014: 6.19), we feared that participants would doubt the 
authenticity of our treatment material and therefore chose to use the CSU. 
 
In our experiment, one group of participants was exposed to a quite substantial televised 
Euroskeptic campaign ad (see Web appendix) attributed to the mainstream party CSU 
(Group 1, n=241). The other experimental group was exposed to the same ad, however, 
the message was explicitly attributed to the radical challenger party (Republikaner; 
Group 2, n=240). In order to increase the external validity and credibility of the 
stimulus material, a real campaign advertisement that the Republikaner party had used 
in their 2009 European election campaign served as the basis. As we intended to test 
messages with a strong Eurosceptic tone – even opposing the general ideas of EU 
integration (for the concept of hard Euroskepticism, see Taggart & Szczerbiak 2004) – 
we manipulated the original material by increasing the negative evaluation of the EU in 
words and pictures. The only variation in the treatment material between the two 
experimental groups were partisan cues. Visually, we inserted party logos in each ad, 
and verbally, the name of the party sending the message was explicitly mentioned.4  
 
In order to analyse treatment effects, we apply a three-step logic: First, to test the 
general effects of a Euroskeptic message sent by a mainstream and a radical party, we 
compare EU attitudes of all participants in each experimental group (Group 1, CSU; 
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Group 2, Republikaner) with a control group (Group 3, n=198) that was not exposed to 
any treatment. In this first step, effects of partisanship and message credibility are still 
confounded. Second, to detect effects of partisanship, we compare the reactions of in-
partisans of the mainstream party in our two experimental groups (Group 1, CSU; 
Group 2, Republikaner). Third, in our search for credibility effects, we focus on out-
partisans and compare their reactions in the two experimental groups (Group 1, CSU; 
Group 2, Republikaner) distinguishing between source and message credibility.  
 
The survey started with a short introduction; participants were then randomly assigned 
to the two treatment groups and the control group. The randomisation of the 
experimental treatment was successful with respect to gender 
[Χ2(2, N =679)=1.66, p =.44], education [Χ 2(6, N = 679) = 5.40, p =.49], and age [F(2)= 
.69,  p =.50]. As we expect that party preference (also see below) has an impact on the 
processing of the ads, it is important to rule out that our different experimental and 
control groups suffer from a partisan bias. As it turns out, this is not the case 
[Χ2(16, N =679)=19.07, p =.27]. After the experimental treatment, participants were 
asked to fill out an online questionnaire including our measures of the dependent, 
moderator, and mediator variables.5 
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Dependent variables 
Participants’ EU attitudes were assessed with an index commonly used in EU research. 
It consists of four original questions (see also Hooghe and Marks 2005; Maier et al. 
2012) assessing a) the European Union’s overall image, b) the evaluation of Germany’s 
EU membership, c) the evaluation of advantages and disadvantages Germany has from 
EU membership, and d) the evaluation of the EU’s general performance. The index 
ranges from 1 (‘very negative attitudes’) to 5 (‘very positive attitudes’) and shows a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .88 (M=2.95; SD=.98).  
 
Moderator and Mediator 
In accordance with the hypotheses, partisanship was used as a moderator and perceived 
credibility of the televised ad as a mediator for the analyses.  
Partisanship was operationalized by the question, which political party participants 
would vote for if elections were held next Sunday. Based on their answers, participants 
were assigned to the following three groups: partisans of the mainstream party (CSU 
respectively its sister party CDU; n=181), partisans of the challenger party 
(Republikaner; n=15), and partisans of other parties or non-voters (“out-partisans”; 
n=483). Of course, most of the subjects subsumed in this last group have an attachment 
to German left-wing parties (Social Democrats (SPD): 30.6%; Green Party (Bündnis 
90/Die Grünen): 19.3%; Left Party (Die Linke): 8.7%). Compared to this, preferences 
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for the Liberal Party (FDP: 8.7%) or the right-wing populist Alternative for Germany 
(AfD: 12.0%) are less frequent in this group. In addition, 22.8% of the participants in 
the out-partisan group have a preference for another party, are still undecided, or non-
voters.  
 
Perceived credibility of the televised ad used as experimental treatment was assessed by 
measuring respondents’ agreement with the statement, “I can rely on the information 
given in the ad” (taken from the “Trust in News Media”-scale by Kohring and Matthes 
2007) and measured on a 5-point scale running from 1 (‘don’t agree at all’) to 5 (‘fully 
agree’).6 This item leaves open whether respondents refer to (1) source credibility or to 
(2) message credibility. Such a broad measurement strategy seems appropriate as 
respondents might not be able to disentangle both aspects of information credibility. 
However, both aspects can be separated in a two-step analysis. First, we compare 
credibility ratings between the two experimental groups, controlling for the propositions 
of the message and thus evaluating the remaining effect of source credibility. We then 
include the credibility ratings in a mediation analysis, differentiating between source 
and message credibility.  
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Results 
According to H1 (mainstream effect-hypothesis), we expect that a right-wing 
mainstream party sending a Euroskeptic message will have a greater impact on citizens’ 
EU attitudes than a party with a radical ideology sending the same Euroskeptic 
message. Table 1 shows the mean EU attitudes (measured by the EU attitude index) in 
the experimental groups after treatment exposure which are compared with the control 
group. The results indicate that Euroskeptic messages indeed yield an effect. First, a 
comparison between the two experimental groups and control group shows that those 
who watched the Euroskeptic advertisements have more negative attitudes towards 
Europe than those who were not exposed to a Euroskeptic message (M=2.90 vs. 3.07; 
t=-2.06, df=677, p<.05). However, it is only the message of the mainstream party (CSU) 
that has a negative effect significantly different from the mean value of the control 
group (M=2.85 vs. 3.07; t=2.44, df=437, p<.05), while the Euroskeptic message sent by 
the radical challenger party (Republikaner) does not yield any significant effect 
(M=2.95 vs. 3.07; t=1.35, df=436, p>.05). On this general level, we can thus confirm 
Hypothesis 1. However, we should be cautious not to overestimate the messenger effect 
as comparing both experimental groups with each other does not lead to statistically 
significant differences (t=1.15, df=479, p>.05).  
 
Table 1.  
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H2 (partisan-hypothesis) expects a classic partisan cueing effect for the mainstream 
party CSU, namely that their partisans should tend to follow their preferred party’s 
message, whereas they should not be affected by the identical message stemming from 
the radical challenger party. The results displayed in Table 2 fully support the 
assumption that mainstream partisans react strongly to their own party’s message, 
whereas they do not react to the same message by the radical challenger party. A 
comparison between the different groups reveals that EU attitudes of supporters of the 
CDU/CSU differ significantly from the control group after watching a Euroskeptic ad 
from their “own” party (M=2.87 vs. 3.34; t=2.71, df=120, p<.01). In contrast to this, the 
Republikaner ad does not have any effect on partisans of the CDU/CSU (M=3.14 vs. 
3.34; t=1.14, df=108, p>.05).  Additional analyses indicate that the significant effect of 
the CSU ad on partisans’ EU attitudes is actually caused by partisans of the CSU, i.e. 
citizens with residence in Bavaria. Compared to partisans of the sister-party CDU, i.e. 
citizens with residence in other parts of Germany, they react much more strongly to this 
ad. Compared to the control group, the difference in EU attitudes is significant only for 
supporters of the CSU (M=2.30 vs. 3.17; t=2.19, df=31, p<.05) but not for supporters of 
the CDU (M=3.15 vs. 3.38; t=1.24, df=87, p>.05). In addition, the difference between 
the CDU and CSU supporters is significant (t=3.63, df=69, p<.01). This result provides 
strong evidence for the existence of a mainstream partisan effect, meaning the message 
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of the preferred party is accepted, while the identical message sent by another party, 
even if it is the sister-party, has no effect. 
 
Table 2.  
 
While H2 asked about specific effects on the mainstream partisans, H3a and H3b focus 
on effects beyond the own partisan base. Here we expect that out-partisans can only be 
affected if they find the information they obtain credible. H3a assumes that mainstream 
parties enjoy higher source credibility compared to radical parties (party credibility-
hypothesis). In Table 3, we compare the evaluations of the credibility of the televised 
ads used as treatment materials in different partisan groups. The difference between the 
groups indicates whether mainstream parties enjoy higher source credibility.  Of course, 
according to our hypothesis a special focus lies on the out-partisans, i.e. all participants 
neither affiliated with CSU nor the Republikaner. As pointed out before, it must be 
noted that the treatment materials were based on a real campaign ad originally broadcast 
by the German Republikaner party and that the material varied only in respect to the 
visual and verbal references to the identity of the party sending the message. 
 
Table 3.  
 
 
 
24 
On average, the perceived credibility of both ads is not rated as high, showing mean 
values clearly below the middle of the scale (3.0). However, on the aggregate level the 
perceived credibility of the two ads differs significantly between the treatment groups. 
The ad that was allegedly sent by the mainstream party CSU is evaluated as more 
credible than the ad allegedly sent by the radical party Republikaner (M=2.46 vs. 2.12; 
t=3.21, df=479, p<.01). However, there is no statistically significant difference in the 
evaluation of the CSU and the Republikaner advertisement by out-partisans (M=2.20 vs. 
2.06; t=1.15, df=335, p>.05). Therefore, we have to reject H3a. As a consequence, the 
greater impact of the mainstream party sending a Euroskeptic message (H1) is due to its 
larger partisan base but not due to its higher source credibility among out-partisans.   
 
The relationship between messenger, perceived message credibility, and effects on out-
partisans’ EU attitudes is displayed in Figure 2, which shows the results from a 
mediation analysis with message credibility being the mediator (M) and EU attitudes 
serving as the dependent variable (Y). Employing Hayes’ PROCESS tool (Hayes, 2015; 
http://afhayes.com/index.html), we are able to report an indirect treatment effect of both 
Euroskeptical advertisements on EU attitudes, which is fully mediated by message 
credibility (IND=.03, BootSE=.03; 95% BootCI [-.02, .10]): people assess the message 
credibility based on the provided source cue (arrow a), and this evaluation affects their 
EU attitudes (arrow b).  The direct treatment effect – which would indicate the 
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independent relevance of source credibility – is not significant if the mediator is 
included (b=.04, SE=.10; p=.702). Based on these findings, we have to reject H3b 
(source cue-hypothesis) that source credibility is crucial for the persuasiveness of 
parties’ messages independently from their message credibility and instead support  H3c 
(source & message credibility-hypothesis) that a message which is perceived as credible 
due to the provided source cue has an effect on out-partisans’ EU attitudes.  
 
Figure 2 
 
Summary and Discussion  
Which parts of the political elite have the potential to increase Euroskeptic attitudes 
within the electorate? Does it make any difference who is communicating Euroskeptic 
messages? The results of our experimental study on the effects of identical Euroskeptic 
messages – one brought forward by the German mainstream party CSU and one given 
by the radical challenger party Die Republikaner – show that a mainstream party 
sending Euroskeptic messages has a greater potential to impact citizens’ EU attitudes. 
First, for the mainstream party, we were able to show a strong partisan effect. We found 
that Euroskepticism voiced in a campaign advertisement by a mainstream party is 
effective among the own partisans even though the content of the ad contradicts the 
party line. The same ad, however, did not show this effect on mainstream partisans if 
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voiced by a radical challenger party. This means that under the current political and 
social conditions in Germany, mainstream parties do play a decisive role in reference to 
the question whether Euroskepticism can influence society as a whole. Second, 
mainstream parties can reach beyond their own partisan base if the recipients perceive 
the advertisement as credible. However, the mainstream ad is not perceived as 
significantly more credible by out-partisans than an identical radical challenger ad. This 
has two implications. First, the mainstream party’s currently wider reach mainly seems 
to stem from its greater partisan base. Second, in a different political and social 
situation, in which more citizens might become open to or even supportive of 
Euroskeptic ideas, the impact of radical Euroskeptic messages could increase 
significantly and also reach far beyond the partisan base of Euroskeptic parties. 
 
These findings stress the relevance of the topic also for future research. First, the 
finding that partisans of the German mainstream party appear so vulnerable to 
Euroskeptic campaign messages is astonishing given the quite positive EU evaluation of 
German mainstream elites. It would be worth analyzing which in-partisans are affected 
(e.g., is it only those partisans who have ambivalent attitudes towards the EU who are 
likely to pick up the Euroskeptic message?; see, e.g., Steenbergen and De Vries 2012; 
Zaller 1992), and which citizens realize that the conveyed message contradicts the 
mainstream party’s line. Further, does this result of strong partisan effects also transfer 
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to other mainstream parties and their partisans with less inclination to go Euroskeptic, 
e.g., to Social Democrats (SPD)?  
 
Second, the finding that a substantial part of our sample is willing to ascribe some form 
of credibility to the advertisement of the radical party is surprising given the fact that 
there is no social consensus in Germany for the messenger (Republikaner). If right-wing 
challengers play a role in forming Euroskeptical attitudes even in this situation, we 
should study which impact radical Euroskeptics have on citizens’ attitudes in political 
systems in which they are no longer considered socially unacceptable, but well 
established (e.g., Front National in France or Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs in Austria). 
In addition, situations in which non-mainstream parties are regarded as competent in EU 
matters and where they attack mainstream parties in this regard (e.g., UK Independence 
Party in the UK) offer great opportunities for cross-country comparisons regarding the 
role of source credibility for the effectiveness of mainstream and challenger parties’ 
EU-related campaign messages. 
 
Finally, our results clearly demonstrate that a message needs to be judged credible to be 
persuasive. Here, we could not detect differences in credibility attributions of out-
partisans between our two treatment groups,. On the other side, we find 38% (CSU ad) 
and 33% (Republikaner ad) of out-partisans rating the advertisements at least as partly 
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credible, causing significant persuasion effects in our mediation analysis. This then 
leaves us with the open question concerning the criteria on which respondents base their 
message credibility ratings. 
 
Of course, our study is not without caveats. While our findings provide a clear picture 
regarding the effectiveness of Euroskeptic campaign messages of mainstream and 
radical challenger parties’ on citizens in general, in many parts of the analysis the group 
of partisans of radical challenger party was too small to allow differentiated 
conclusions. This problem results from the representative sampling strategy and an 
insufficient number of subjects with a preference for the radical challenger party. 
However, it seems worthwhile to assess the effects of party campaigns on partisans of 
radical parties more precisely.  Moreover, our experiment cannot answer the question to 
which degree our results can be generalized. Possibly, Euroskeptic communication 
leads to different dynamics in other countries where right-wing Euroskeptics are already 
well-established. This calls for comparative research on the relevance of country-
contexts for the effectiveness of Euroskeptic messages which might allow us to 
understand the variation in the success of Euroskeptic parties in the last European 
Parliament elections.  
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Notes 
1. It is important to note that party identification and credibility are not 
independent: For in-partisans, the perception of source and message credibility 
is influenced by party attachment (see, e.g., Campbell et al. 1960). However, 
according to current research, credibility should be a distinct factor of message 
evaluation for out-partisans. 
2. The gfk online panel is representative for online users in Germany. However, 
because the representation of the total citizenship was important for our study, a 
quota sample was drawn taking into account the variables age, education, 
gender, and geographic region. The quotas were chosen in accordance with the 
distribution of the criterion in the total national population. A deviation of 20% 
from the specific quota was regarded as tolerable. 
3. Initially, 1758 people were invited to participate in the study per email. Of the 
1752 persons who responded, a quota sample of 1089 persons was drawn taking 
into account the variables age, education, gender, and geographic region. The 
selected participants received a link to the online-questionnaire; one reminder 
was sent out to increase the response-rate. The quality of the interviews was 
ensured by using the GfK-tool TIGO. This tool a) detects specific patterns of 
participants’ answers to standardized questions (e.g., straightlining); b) evaluates 
the length of answers to open questions; and c) takes into account the time that a 
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participant spent in filling out the questionnaire (min. 11 minutes, max. 60 
minutes). Interviews which were evaluated as “not satisfactory” according to 
these criteria were removed from the sample (N = 44). In addition, 125 
incomplete interviews were excluded. 241 participants belonged to a third 
treatment group which received a positive campaign advertisement as treatment 
and which is not considered in this analysis. 
4. The wording of the advertisements can be found in the Web appendix to this 
paper. 
5. Participants assigned to the control group filled out the questionnaire without 
being exposed to any treatment. The wording of all variables can be found in the 
Web appendix. 
6. Message credibility in this paper is conceptualized as one predictor of the 
persuasiveness of party ads and theoretically distinct from the dependent 
variable (EU attitudes). The empirical correlation between perceived ad 
credibility and the dependent variable supports our argument that both concepts 
are theoretically related but not identical (r = -.31; p < .001; N = 481). 
 
Acknowledgements 
Our work on this paper was supported by grants from The Netherlands Institute for 
Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIAS) as well as by the 
 
 
31 
Research Network ‘Communication, Media and Politics’ at the University of Koblenz-
Landau to Michaela Maier, Silke Adam and Jürgen Maier. We thank Julian Erben, 
Stefan Krause, Andrea Retzbach, and Frank Schneider for their work on the 
development of the instruments.  
 
Literature 
Appelman, A., and S. S. Sundar. 2015. “Measuring Message Credibility: Construction 
and Validation of an Exclusive Scale.” Journalism & Mass Communication 
Quarterly: 1-21.  
Arceneaux, K. 2008. "Can Partisan Cues Diminish Democratic Accountability?" 
Political Behavior 30(2): 139-160.  
Armingeon, K., and B. Ceka. 2014. "The loss of trust in the European Union during the 
great recession since 2007: The role of heuristics from the national potlicial 
system." Europen Union Politics 15(1): 82-107.  
Bakker, R., Edwards, E., Hooghe, L., … and M. Zilovic 2015. 1999-2014 Chapel Hill 
Expert Survey Trend File. Version 2015.1. Available on: chesdata.eu. Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. 
Brader, T., and J. A. Tucker. 2012. "Following the Party's Lead. Party Cues, Policy 
Opinion, and the Power of Partisanship in Three Multiparty Systems." 
Comparative Politics 44(4): 403-420.  
 
 
32 
Brader, T., J. A. Tucker, and D. Duell. 2012. "Which Parties Can Lead Opinion? 
Experimental Evidence on Partisan Cue Taking in Multiparty Democracies." 
Comparative Political Studies 46(11): 1185-1517.  
Bullock, J. G. 2011. "Elite Influence on Public Opinion in an Informed Electorate." 
American Political Science Review 105(3): 496-515.  
Cacioppo, J. T., and R. E. Petty. 1984. "The elaboration likelihood model of 
persuasion." Advances in consumer research 11(1): 673-675. 
Campbell A., P. E. Converse, W. E. Miller, and D. E. Stokes. 1960. The American 
Voter. New York, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Chaiken, S. 1980. "Heuristic versus systematic information processing and the use of 
source versus message cues in persuasion." Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology. 39(5): 752-766. 
Chaiken S., and D. Maheswaran. 1994. "Heuristic Procesing Can Bias Systematic 
Procesing: Effects of Source Credibility, Argument Ambiguity, And Task 
Importance on Attitude Judgment." Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 66(3): 460-473.  
Coan T. G., J. L. Merolla, L. B. Stephenson, and E. J. Zechmeister. 2008. "It's Not Easy 
Being Green: Minor Party Labels as Heuristic Aids." Political Psychology 
29(3): 389-405.  
 
 
33 
Cohen, G. L. 2003. "Party Over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group Influence on 
Political Beliefs." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 85(5): 808-822.  
Crum, B. 2007. "Party Stances in the Referendums on the EU Constitution: Causes and 
Consequences of Competiton and Collusion." European Union Politics 8(1): 61-
82.  
Dancey, L., and G. Sheagley. 2013. "Heuristics Behaving Badly: Party Cues and Voter 
Knowledge." American Journal of Political Science 57(2): 312-325. 
De Vries, C. E., and E. E. Edwards. 2009. "Taking Europe to its Extremes. Extremist 
Parties and Public Euroscepticism." Party Politics 15(1): 5-28.  
Druckman, J. N. 2001. "Using Credible Advice to Overcome Framing Effects." The 
Journal of Law, Economics & Organizations 17(1): 62-82.  
Druckman, J. N. 2001. "On the limits of framing effects: who can frame?" Journal of 
Politics 63(4): 1041-1066. 
Eurobarometer. 2013. "National report Germany no. 79.5." Accessed 28.6.2016. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/eurobarometre/2013/election/EB79.5%20EP
%20EUROBAROMETER%20DE%20(DE).pdf 
Hayes, A. F. 2015. Introduction to Mediation, Moderation, and Conditional Process 
Analysis. A Regression-Based Approach. New York: Guilford. 
Hobolt, S. B., and C. E. De Vries, 2011. Issue Entrepreneurship & Multiparty 
Competition. Working paper.   
 
 
34 
Hobolt, S. B., and C. Wratil. 2015. "Public opinion and the crisis: the dynamics of 
support for the euro." Journal of European Public Policy 22(2): 238-256. doi: 
10.1080.13501763.2014.994022. 
Hooghe, L., and G. Marks. 2005. "Calculation, Community and Cues: Public Opinion 
on European Integration." European Union Politics 6(4): 419-443.  
Hovland, C. I. 1954. “Effects of the mass media communication.” In Handbook of 
social psychology: Special fields and applications edited by G. Lindzey, 1062-
1103. Cambridge: Addison-Wesley. 
Hovland, C. I., and W. Weiss. 1951. "The influence of source credibility on 
communication effectiveness." Public opinion quarterly 15(4): 635-650. 
Jackob, N. 2008. “Credibility Effects.” In The International Encyclopedia of 
Communication, edited by W. Donsbach. Blackwell Publishing, Blackwell 
Reference Online. Status as of 16 February 2016 
Kam, C. D. 2005. "Who Toes the Party Line? Cues, Values, and Individual 
Differences." Political Behavior 27(2): 163-182.  
Kareklas, I., D. D. Muehling, and T. J. Weber. 2015. "Reexamining health messages in 
the digital age: a fresh look at source credibility effects." Journal of Advertising 
44(2): 88-104.  
Kumkale, G. T., D. Albarracín, and P. J. Seignourel. 2010. "The effects of source 
credibility in the presence or absence of prior attitudes: Implications for the 
 
 
35 
design of persuasive communication campaigns." Journal of applied social 
psychology 40(6): 1325-1356. 
Lau, R. R., and D. P. Redlawsk. 2001. "Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive 
Heuristics in Political Decision Making." Amercian Journal of Political Science 
45(4): 951-971.  
Lindberg, L., and S. Scheingold. 1970. Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change 
in the European Community. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Lupia, A., and M. D. McCubbins. 1998. The democratic dilemma: Can citizens learn 
what they really need to know? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Maier M, Adam S and Maier J (2012) The impact of identity and economic cues on 
citizens’ EU support: An experimental study on the effects of party 
communication in the run-up to the 2009 European Parliament elections. 
European Union Politics 13: 580-603.  
Maier J and Rittberger B (2008) Shifting Europe’s Boundaries. Mass Media, Public 
Opinion, and the Enlargement of the EU. European Union Politics 9: 243-267. 
Merolla, J. L., L. B. Stephenson, and E. J. Zechmeister. 2008. "Can Canadians Take a 
Hint? The (In)Effectiveness of Party Labels as Information Shortcuts in 
Canada." Canadian Journal of Political Science 41(3): 673-696.  
Metzger, M. J., A.J. Flanagin, K. Eyal, D. Lemus, and R. McCann. 2003. “Credibility 
for the 21st century: Integrating perspectives on source, message, and media 
 
 
36 
credibility in the contemporary media environment.” Communication Yearbook, 
27: 293-335. 
Miller, J. M., and J. A. Krosnick. 2000. "News media impact on the ingredients of 
presidential evaluations: Politically knowledgable citizens are guided by a 
trusted source." American Journal of Political Science 44(2): 301-315.  
Mondak, J. J. 1993. "Public opinion and heuristic processing of source cues." Political 
Behavior 15(2): 167-192.  
O'keefe, Daniel J. 2015. Persuasion: Theory and research. Sage Publications. 
Perloff, R. M. 2010. The dynamics of persuasion: communication and attitudes in the 
twenty-first century. Oxon: Routledge. 
Petty, R. E., and J. T. Cacioppo. 1996. Attitudes and persuasion: Classic and 
contemporary approaches. Boulder: Westview Press 
Petty, R. E., and Cacioppo, J. T. 1986. The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. 
New York: Springer.  
Pornpitakpan, C. 2004. "The Persuasiveness of Source Credibility: A Critical Review of 
Five Decades' Evidence." Journal of Applied Social Psychology 34(2): 243-281.  
Rahn, W. M. 1993. "The Role of Partisan Stereotypes in Information Processing about 
Politcial Candidates." American Journal of Political Science 37(2): 472-496.  
Ray, L. 2003. "When Paries Matter: The Conditional Influence of Party Positions on 
Voter Opinion about European Integration." Journal of Politics 65(4): 978-994.  
 
 
37 
Ray, L. 2007. "Mainstream Euroskepticism: Trend or Oxymoron?" Acta Politica 42(2-
3): 153-172.  
Rouner, Donna. 2008. “Credibility of Content.” In The International Encyclopedia of 
Communication, edited by W. Donsbach. Blackwell Reference Online. Status as 
of 16 February 2016 
Schenk, Michael. 2008. “Sleeper Effect.” In The International Encyclopedia of 
Communication, edited by W. Donsbach. Status as of 16 February 2016 
Slothuus, R., and C. H. De Vreese. 2010. "Political parties, motivated reasoning, and 
issue framing effects." The Journal of Politics 72(3): 630-645. 
Sniderman, P. 2000. "Taking Sides: A Fixed Choice  Theory of Political Reasoning." In 
Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice, and the Bounds of Rationality, edited 
by A. Lupia, M. D. McCubbins, and S. L. Popkin. New York: Cambridge 
University Press: 67-84. 
Steenbergen, M.R., and C. E. De Vries. 2012. "Variable Opinions: The predictability of 
support for unification in European mass publics." Journal of Political 
Marketing 12(1): 121-141.  
Steenbergen, M.R., E. E. Edwards, and C. E. De Vries. 2007. "Who’s Cueing Whom? 
Mass-Elite Linkages and the Future of European Integration." European Union 
Politics 8(13): 13-35.  
 
 
38 
Sternthal, B., L. W. Phillips, and R. Dholakia. 1978. "The persuasive effect of scarce 
credibility: a situational analysis." Public Opinion Quarterly (42)3: 285-314 
Tajfel, H., M. G. Billig, R. P. Bundy, and C. Flament. 1971. "Social categorization and 
intergroup behavior." European Journal of Social Psychology 1(2): 149-178. 
Taggart, P., and A. Szczerbiak. 2004. "Contemporary Euroskepticism in the party 
systems of the European Union candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe." 
European Journal of Political Research 43(1): 1-27.  
Witte, K. 2008. “Message Effects, Structure of.” In The International Encyclopedia of 
Communication, edited by W. Donsbach. Blackwell Publishing. Blackwell 
Reference Online. Status as of 16 February 2016 
Zaller, J. 1992. The Nature and Origin of Public Opinion. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
Table 1. Effects of a Euroskeptic campaign message sent by a mainstream and a radical right-wing 
challenger party on EU attitudes 
 Mean SD N 
Both treatment groups 2.90a .98 481 
Sender of Euroskeptic Message    
Mainstream Party (=CSU) 2.85a .98 241 
Challenger Party 
(=Republikaner) 2.95 .97 240 
Control group 3.07 .97 198 
Level of significance (difference between treatment group and control group): a: p<.05, b: p<.01, 
c: p<.001. 
 
Table 2. Moderating effects between preference for a mainstream party (CDU/CSU) and sender of 
a Euroskeptic campaign message on EU attitudes 
 Mean SD N 
Sender of Euroskeptic Message    
Mainstream Party (=CSU) 2.87b 1.01 71 
Challenger Party 
(=Republikaner) 3.14 .96 59 
Control group 3.34 .90 51 
Level of significance (difference between treatment group and control group): a: p<.05, b: p<.01, 
c: p<.001. 
 
Table 3. Perceived credibility of Euroskeptic messages by party preference 
   Preference for 
 Total CDU/CSU Republikaner Other/no Party (“out-partisans") 
Sender of 
Euroskeptic 
Message 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
Mainstream Party 
(=CSU) 2.46
b 241 3.03c 71 3.00 4 2.20 166 
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Challenger Party 
(=Republikaner) 2.12 240 2.12 59 3.20 10 2.06 171 
Level of significance (difference between the two treatment groups): a: p<.05, b: p<.01, c: p<.001. 
 
